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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3 (2)(j) (2003).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Where Randy T. Simonsen is a named party in AWINCs complaints, and
where the judgment enjoins him from denying public access to Middle Fork Road, and
where he owns an interest in the other entities involved, does the Mr. Simonsen have
standing to prosecute this appeal?
(Preservation of issue and standard of review - see appellee brief)
2. Have the Appellants sufficiently marshaled the evidence in support of the
trial court's finding of public use of Middle Fork Road?
(Preservation of issue and standard of review - see appellee brief)
3. Where there is evidence that Simonsen's successors in interest attempted to
keep the public off of Middle Fork Road, and that witnesses were not from the general
public, did the trial court correctly determine that Middle Fork Road is dedicated and
abandoned to the public?
(Preservation of issue and standard of review - see appellant and appellee briefs)
4. Were the trial court's findings of fact clearly supported by the evidence?
(Preservation of issue and standard of review - see appellant and appellee briefs)
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES OR REGULATIONS
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 72-5-104(1) (2003) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(1) A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has
been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period often years.
§ 27-12-89 (1998), which was effective until 1998 when it was
repealed and renumbered as § 72-5-104(1), provided as follows:

UTAH CODE ANN.

A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the use of
the public when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a
period often years.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Unless identified individually, the defendants in the trial court will collectively be
referred to as "Simonsen/' the plaintiff below will be referred to as AWINC. See the
earlier briefs filed by Appellants and Appellee for additional facts.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

Randy T. Simonsen is a party in interest and has standing to prosecute this

appeal because he is a named party in AWINC's original and amended complaints. Mr.
Simonsen also has standing based on the fact that he suffered a distinct and palpable
injury creating a personal interest in the outcome of the dispute because he was adversely
affected by the trial court's judgment. Mr. Simonsen is also a party in interest through
his business entities Randy T. Simonsen Ltd., and Simlew L.C. Mr. Simonsen cannot be
distinguished from these entities when it comes to his interest in the disputed property
because anything that adversely affects Mr. Simonsen's businesses will adversely affect
Mr. Simonsen.
II.

Simonsen has sufficiently marshaled all relevant evidence to support the trial

court's ultimate determination in this case. The evidence that AWINC has listed in its
brief is either substantially repetitive of evidence stated by Simonsen or is not relevant to
the trial court's ultimate application of the law in this case. Since the marshaling
requirement has been met, this Court reviews the trial court's factual findings under a
clearly erroneous standard.
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III. The trial court incorrectly determined that Middle Fork Road was abandoned
to public use under § 72-5-104(1). The placement of "no trespassing" signs at the
junction where Middle Fork Road begins and breaks off from Left Fork Road was
sufficient to interrupt the continuous use requirement. The placing of a "no trespassing"
sign in the area of the beginning of a road would signify to a reasonable person that both
the road and the adjoining land is prohibited from use. AWINC's four witnesses were
not members of the general public because of their special interest in seeing that Middle
Fork Road become public.
IV.

The court's finding of fact number twenty four is not clearly supported by

the evidence presented at trial. The testimony by AWINC's four witnesses was not
enough to show public use nor could any public use be proven clearly or convincingly by
maps or photos. The posting of "no trespass" at the junction of Middle Fork Road where
it breaks off from Left Fork Road interrupted the continuous use required by the statute.
ARGUMENT
Appellant Randy T. Simonsen, has standing, for a variety of reasons, to prosecute
this appeal. Simonsen has met its marshaling requirement in this case by stating all
evidence relevant to the trial court's ultimate determination in this case. The trial court
incorrectly applied the law and based its findings on insufficient evidence.

3
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APPELLANT, RANDY T. SIMONSEN, HAS STANDING TO
PROSECUTE THIS APPEAL BECAUSE HE WAS NAMED IN THE
COMPLAINTS, SUFFERED DISTINCT AND PALPABLE INJURY,
AND BECAUSE HE IS THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY
THROUGH HIS BUSINESS ENTITIES.

Randy Simonsen has standing to prosecute this appeal because he is a named party
to the lawsuit. Moreover, the trial court's judgment lists Mr. Simonsen as an "owner"
and requires that he remove the lock from his gate that crosses Middle Fork Road, and
allow the public to have unlimited access. (R.451). Furthermore, Randy is an interested
party through his business entities, Randy T. Simonsen Ltd., and Simlew L.C., because
any adverse affect on Mr. Simonsen's business entities will adversely affect Mr.
Simonsen.
In order to prosecute an action, one must be personally adversely affected. Jenkins
v. State, 585 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1978). The most widely used standard to establish
standing " . . . . requires a plaintiff to show some distinct and palpable injury that gives
rise to a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute." National Parks and Conservation
Assn' v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1993). "Whether a plaintiff has
the requisite personal stake to challenge a governmental action turns on (1) the existence
of an adverse impact on plaintiffs rights, (2) a causal relationship between the
governmental action that is challenged and the adverse impact on the plaintiffs rights,
and (3) the likelihood that the relief requested will redress the injury claimed. Id. If this
standard cannot be met, " . . . . standing may still be established for important 'public
issues' if 'no one else has a greater interest in the outcome . . . ." Id.
4

Individuals who are not". . . . a party to the trial court proceeding" will usually not
have standing. Overturfv. University of Utah Medical Center, 1999 Utah 3, ^f 5, 973
P.2d 413, 415, (Utah 1999) (holding that because Oxendine was not a named party to the
legal proceedings, she could not establish standing).
A.

Randy T. Simonsen is a party in interest with standing to prosecute
this appeal because he is a named party in the AWINC's complaints.

Mr. Simonsen has standing because he is a named party to the lawsuit. On
November 21, 2000, AWINC, filed a complaint in the Fourth Judicial District Court, in
and for Wasatch County, State of Utah, listing Randy T. Simonsen as the defendant.
(R.8). Nearly a year later, on September 5, 2001, AWINC filed an amended complaint
adding Randy T. Simonsen Ltd., and Simlew L.C. as defendants. (R.51). The amended
complaint also added a cause of action requesting that the trial court declare Middle Fork
Road to be abandoned to the public. (R.47).
Mr. Simonsen5 s name appears on the amended complaint as a named party. Since
AWINC continued to included Randy T. Simonsen as a named party in the amended
complaint, it must have thought that Mr. Simonsen was a party in interest; otherwise, Mr.
Simonsen's individual name would have been removed. It wrould be unfair and
prejudicial to Mr. Simonsen if AWINC is now, after more than four years, allowed to
claim that Mr. Simonsen lacks standing when it was AWINC who first named Mr.
Simonsen as a party in its complaints. Mr. Simonsen is a named party in the complaints,
and the trial court proceedings, and therefore he has standing to prosecute this appeal.
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B.

Appellant, Randy T. Simonsen, can show a distinct and palpable
injury giving rise to a personal stake in the dispute because appellant
was personally required to do something against his interest and
adverse to his rights.

Randy T. Simonsen can show a distinct and palpable injury giving rise to a
personal stake in the dispute because the trial court's judgment required him to personally
engage in conduct contrary to his interest and adverse to his rights. Specifically, the
judgment required that Mr. Simonsen remove or cause to be removed "

the lock on

that certain gate currently placed . . . across Middle Fork Road . . . . " (R.451). The
judgment also forbids Mr. Simonsen from placing " . . . . any other lock or locking device
on the gate that prohibits ingress and egress through the gate by members of the public ..
.." (R.451). Moreover, the judgment enjoins Mr. Simonsen from " . . . . maintaining any
gate across Middle Fork Road in a closed and locked condition and from obstructing or
preventing access by the public." (R.450).
The judgment does not distinguish between Randy T. Simonsen, Randy T.
Simonsen Ltd., or Simlew L.C.; therefore, because Mr. Simonsen is a named party, if he
does not adhere to the terms of the Judgment, he could be held in contempt of court. The
judgment creates an adverse impact on Mr. Simonsen's rights at a property owner, this
adverse impact is directly related to governmental action, and the relief he requests will
redress the injury he claims. Mr. Simonsen can demonstrate a distinct and palpable
injury giving rise to a personal stake in the dispute; therefore, he has standing to
prosecute this appeal.
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Beyond the standard above, Mr. Simonsen can also establish standing because the
dedication of a road to the public is an important public issue, and no other person has a
greater interest in the outcome than Mr. Simonsen.
C.

Randy T. Simonsen owns an interest in the two business entities that
were his co-defendants in the trial court below; therefore, he is a
party of interest to this appeal.

Mr. Simonsen has an ownership interest in both Randy T. Simonsen Ltd., and
Simlew, L.C., and through his ownership of these two entities, Mr. Simonsen is a party of
interest in this case. Mr. Simonsen is so closely intertwined with these entities that there
can be no distinction in the effect of this judgment between him and the other defendants.
Because of the close relationship, anything that adversely affects his business entities,
will adversely affect Mr. Simonsen. When the judge ruled against the two business
entities it affected Mr. Simonsen personally because it was not the entities who were
required to physically remove or cause to be removed the lock on the gate, it was Mr.
Simonsen. Moreover, Randy T. Simonsen Ltd., and Simlew L.C. are intangible and
incapable of feeling the effects of the judgment; therefore, because of his ownership of
these entities, Mr. Simonsen bears the burden of the judgment, not the other defendants.
Through his business entities, Mr. Simonsen owns the property in question. Mr.
Simonsen, through these entities, pays property taxes on the land, and all other costs
associated with owning the land. It would be unjust and prejudicial to hold that Mr.
Simonsen does not have standing because actual title to the land in question is held by the
business entities that he owns. Mr. Simonsen was adversely impacted by the judgment
7

against his businesses, Mr. Simonsen has therefore demonstrated a distinct and palpable
injury giving rise to a personal stake in the dispute; thus, Mr. Simonsen has standing to
prosecute this appeal.
Randy T. Simonsen has standing to prosecute this appeal because he is a named
party to the lawsuit, has suffered and can show a distinct and palpable injury giving rise
to a personal stake in the dispute, and because he owns an interest in the business entities
who hold title to the property in dispute. It would be unfair and prejudicial for AWINC
to claim or this Court to hold that Mr. Simonsen lacks standing when he was named in the
complaints, suffered distinct and palpable injury, and owns both business entities that
own title to the land. This issue is important to public interest, and no one else has more
interest in the outcome than Mr. Simonsen. For the above mentioned reasons, Randy T.
Simonsen has standing to prosecute this appeal.
II.

SIMONSEN HAS SUFFICIENTLY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF PUBLIC USE
OF MIDDLE FORK ROAD.

Simonsen has sufficiently marshaled all relevant evidence to support the trial
court's ultimate determination in this case. Evidence pointed out by AWINC is either
repetitive of evidence stated by Simonsen or not relevant to the trial court's ultimate
application of law. Because Simonsen has met the marshaling requirement this court
does not assume the record supports the factual findings of the trial court and reviews the
trial court's findings under a clearly erroneous standard.
In order to show that the trial court's finding of fact was clearly erroneous,
8

Simonsen is required to marshal and present all competent evidence that supports the trial
court's findings. West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). Simonsen has the burden of proving that any non-marshaled
evidence is irrelevant. Harding v. Bell, 2002 UT 108, ^ 21, 57 P.3d 1093. Evidence is
relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401.
The trial court was presented with evidence by AWINC in an attempt to show that
Middle Fork Road was dedicated and abandoned to the public pursuant to Utah Code.
For a court to determine that a highway has been dedicated and abandoned to the public,
it must be proven that the road " . . . . has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare
for a period often years." UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-5-104(1). This court, interpreting
former § 27-12-89, has also ruled that there are only three factors that must be proven to
show dedication of a highway to the public. Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d
806, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Those three factors are (1) continuous use, (2) as a
public thoroughfare, and (3) for a period often years. Id.

These factors must be

proven by clear and convincing evidence. Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910, 913 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996).
The marshaling requirement requires that Simonsen present all competent or
relevant evidence submitted at trial to prove the above mentioned factors. Simonsen did
just that and the evidence pointed out by AWINC is either not relevant to the
9

determination of applicability of the statute or substantially repetitive of what Simonsen
presented in their brief.
Under its second argument AWINC has listed fourteen items to base its claim of
insufficient marshaling of the evidence. Appellee's brief at 15. The following details
why each item is not relevant or repetitive of what Simonsen presented.
1. In item number one AWINC points out that David Ellis testified that he spent
twenty days or more a year in the Middle Fork Area, that he did not own or ever lease the
area, and that in 1997 he drove a truck on the road. Appellee's brief at 15-16. In
Simonsen's brief it was pointed out that Mr. Ellis begin using the road in 1977 or 1978
and that he used the road to access property in the area five to eight times a year.
Appellants' brief at 7, 28. The facts listed by AWINC are repetitive of those listed by
Simonsen. The only distinction between the two statements is that AWINC points out the
number of days each year Mr. Ellis used the road and Simonsen stated the number of
trips. It was never Simonsen's contention that Mr. Ellis did not use the road many times
each year, but that he was not a member of the disinterested public as required by law.
Appellants' brief at 30-31.
2. In item number two AWINC lists the amount of time that its witness Fred
Addis spent in the Middle Fork Area. Again the distinction is that Simonsen listed the
number or times or trips Mr. Addis took to the area each year and AWINC lists the
number of days. These facts are again repetitive. Identical to item number one,
Simonsen does not dispute that Mr. Addis used the road many times throughout the years,
10

in fact Simonsen states that it is this large amount of usage that disqualifies Mr. Addis as
a member of the general public for purposes of the applicability of this statute.
Appellants'brief at 31.
3. Item number three lists the amount of time Kenneth Earl was in the Middle
Fork Area. Similar to the above two items, the facts that AWINC lists and the facts that
Simonsen lists are similar. The difference is that AWINC lists the number of days,
Appellee's brief at 16, and Simonsen lists the times or trips. Appellants' brief at 9.
Although Mr. Earl does state that he has been in the Middle Fork area seven to nine times
a year not three to four as stated by Simonsen this fact is not material as again Simonsen
does not dispute that Mr. Earl used the area a great deal over the years. Beyond this, the
trial court's finding of fact number fourteen states that Mr. Earl used the road four or five
times a year. (R.445).
4. Item number four states that AWINC witness Cullen Goodwin never leased
property in the area. Simonsen states in their brief that each of the AWINC witnesses
testified that they "did not own property in the area." Appellants' brief at 35. In this way
Simonsen stated that Mr. Goodwin did not have any ownership interest in the area. The
fact that Mr. Goodwin did not own the property and the fact that he did not lease the
property are facts that are similar. Again, it is not Simonsen's contention that Mr.
Goodwin does not qualify as a member of the public because he leased property.
Simonsen contends that Mr. Goodwin is not a member of the public because, inter alia,
of his self-serving interest in the area. Id. at 31.
11

5. Item number five concerns Simonsen's witness William Irving. AWINC states
that Mr. Ivring determined public access was a problem and that "[h]e did not do
anything personally to keep people off of Middle Fork Road." Appellee's brief at 16.
Simonsen in fact addressed Mr. Ivring's activities on the land extensively in their brief.
Appellants' brief at 20. This is evidence that Simonsen addressed.
6. Item number six states that Simonsen witness Orrin Jackson had not been in the
Middle Fork area since 1980. Appellee's brief at 16. Simonsen stated in their brief that
Mr. Jackson made repeated efforts to keep people off Middle Fork road " . . . . during the
time the Jackson's owned the lease on the land . . . . " Appellants' brief at 19. Simonsen
then stated that the Jackson's turned over or sold their lease in the early 1970fs. Id. at 20.
The fact that Orrin Jackson had not been in the area since 1980 is not an important fact in
this case.
7. Item number seven related to Mr. Simonsen's testimony that he went to the
property in 1995 and observed the public using portions of the property. Appellee's brief
at 16. These facts were referred to in Simonsen's brief when it was stated that Mr.
Blanchard and Mr. Simonsen went to the property in 1995, and that Mr. Simonsen
terminated the lease with Mr. Wilson after buying the property because Wilson was
authorizing hunters to use the land. Appellants' brief at 11-12.
8.-14. Items number eight through fourteen refer to various maps, aerial photos
and a video by AWINC witness Cullen Goodwin that were offered in evidence at trial.
Although Simonsen does describe with particularity the location of the disputed property
12

and road, Appellants' brief at 4-6, these items were not brought up by Simonsen in their
brief because they are not relevant or supportive of the ultimate determination of
applicability of the statute in this case.
As stated above, the only factors that the trial court may consider when
determining whether a highway is dedicated to the public pursuant to § 72-5-104(1) are
(1) continuous use, (2) as a public thoroughfare, and (3) for a period often years. The
maps, aerial photos and video mentioned by AWINC do not assist the trial court in this
ultimate determination.
AWINC states that the maps show that the road was sufficient enough to be
recorded on a map and that the photos and video show the condition of the road.
Appellee's brief at 17-18. AWINC also states that these photos show that "continuous
and substantial use was being made of the road generating a physical condition clearly
observable." Id. at 31. Neither the placement of Middle Fork Road on a map nor its
observable physical condition in a photo or video prove any one of the three required
elements of § 72-5-104(1). Although the maps, photos, and video may show use, there is
no way to determine from those exhibits whether the use was with or without permission.
The trial court could not just assume that all use which created the visible road was nonpermissive. The trial court could not just assume that because Middle Fork Road was
shown on maps it was used continuously by the general public for ten years. Many
private roads show up on maps and photos.
The burden at trial was on AWINC. It was AWINC5s burden to present competent
13

evidence to show continuous use of Middle Fork Road by the general public for ten
years. Maps, photos and video can not satisfy that burden. A careful look at the trial
court's findings of facts shows that the determination that the road was continuously used
by the public for 10 years was based not on maps, photos or video but was supported
solely on the testimony of the four plaintiff witnesses. (Finding of fact 14,15, and 22;
R.443-45). Because the maps, photos, and video listed by AWINC are not relevant to the
ultimate determination of the applicability of the statute, they were not discussed by
Simonsen.
As demonstrated above, each of the factual items that AWINC lists are either not
relevant to the ultimate determination of the of applicability of the statute or substantially
repetitive of what Simonsen presented or referred to in their brief. Thus Simonsen
marshaled all competent evidence relative to the determination of the application of the
statute and properly discharged their marshaling duty. Because Simonsen properly
marshaled the evidence this court cannot assume the record supports the factual findings
of the trial court and thus must analyze the trial court's findings of facts under a clearly
erroneous standard.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY INCORRECTLY DETERMINING
THAT MIDDLE FORK ROAD IS ABANDONED TO PUBLIC USE.
Based on the evidence at trial, the court incorrectly determined that Middle Fork
Road had been continuously used, as a public thoroughfare. "No trespassing" signs
placed at the start of Middle Fork Road at its junction with Left Fork road interrupted the
14

continuous use of the road. Beyond this, the witnesses presented by AWINC were not
sufficient to constitute members of the general public.
Section 27-12-89, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 was repealed and renumbered in
1998 as Section 72-5-104(1). See L 1998, Ch. 270 § 132. Section 72-5-104(1) reads:
(1) A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has
been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period often years.
Thus, as this Court ruled in Campbell, 962 P.2d at 808, the three factors that must
be proven in order for a road to be determined dedicated to the public pursuant to statute
are (1) continuous use, (2) as a public thoroughfare, (3) for a period often years. These
three factors must be proved at trial by clear and convincing evidence, and the burden of
establishing public use is on those claiming it. Kohler, 916 P.2d at 913; Leo M.
Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211, 213 (Utah 1981). Although
AWINC asks in its issue statement number three, whether the court's conclusion based
upon the evidence was clearly erroneous, Appellee's brief at 1, the correct standard of
review for application of this statute is "correctness" not "clearly erroneous." Campbell,
962 P.2d at 807-808. At trial, the court incorrectly applied the law based on the evidence
presented.

15

A.

The placement of "No Trespass" signs at the junction of Left Fork
and Middle Fork roads was sufficient to interrupt use and indicated
use of both the road and adjacent land was prohibited.

The trial court incorrectly determined Middle Fork Road had been used
continuously by the public when the evidence showed that since the early 1960's there
had been no trespassing signs placed at the junction where Middle Fork Road breaks off
from Left Fork Road. These no trespassing signs at the junction indicated that the use of
both the road and of the adjacent land was prohibited and the signs were sufficient to
interrupt use.
As stated in Simonsen's original brief, several cases, while not directly
determining the effect on use, have touched on "no trespassing" signs as a way to
interrupt continuous use. Appellant brief at 17-18; See Draper City v. Estate of
Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995); Kohler, 916 P.2d at 913-14.
AWINC suggests that the no trespassing signs were not sufficient because they had
been placed only the junction of Middle Fork Road and Left Fork Road and that they
were only intended to prevent use of the land not the road. Appellee's brief at 21-24.
AWINC states that there was continuous use of the road notwithstanding the evidence
presented by Simonsen at trial indicating that several witnesses did believe use of Middle
Fork Road was prohibited, and that early and ongoing attempts were made by
predecessors in interest of the land to keep people off the land and road. Id.
In reality, for the last several decades, spanning back to the early 1960's efforts
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were made to keep the public from using Middle Fork Road and the land accessed by it.
These efforts included dragging logs across the trial that is now Middle Fork Road by the
Jacksons in the 1960?s, and the placement of rocks and tires with the words "No
Trespass" painted on them at the junction of Middle Fork Road and Left Fork Road.
Appellant's brief at 19-22. The trial court, in its finding of fact number eleven also found
that such efforts were made stating that the words "No Trespass" had been painted on
rocks and tires and " . . . . placed in the general area where Middle Fork Road accessed
Left Fork Road and upon Middle Fork Road in that general area . . . . " (R.446).
Although the trial court found that these efforts did not prevent public use of Middle Fork
road, there is no question that the no trespassing signs were present for a long period at
the junction of Middle Fork and Left Fork roads. (R.446).
The posting of no trespassing signs at the junction of Middle Fork and Left Fork
road is sufficient to prevent the continuous use as required by law. Middle Fork Road
begins at the junction with Left Fork Road and the placement of signs or other barricades
would be natural barriers at that point. Once signs were posted at the junction it would
be unnecessary to continue to post them along the entire road. Once a person had passed
the junction they would have seen the no trespassing signs and would have been illegally
trespassing on the road and the property.
AWINC's argument that the posting of no trespassing signs was only to prevent
passage on the adjacent land and not intended to prevent use of Middle Fork Road itself,
is not convincing. The testimony, as described in Appellants' brief and above, showed
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that blockades and no trespassing signs had been placed throughout the years at the
junction where Middle Fork Road breaks off from Left Fork Road. A no trespassing sign
placed at the beginning of a road would indicate to a reasonable person that the road itself
is prohibited from use. In fact, Simonsen presented a witness at trial who testified that he
did not feel he could used Middle Fork Road because of those signs and another who
stated that signs like that would prevent his use. (R.481:31 ;R.481:50). This testimony
and common sense shows that these signs, placed at the beginning of Middle Fork Road
at the junction from Left Fork Road, would signify that the use of both the road and
adjacent land was prohibited.
The placement of barricades and no trespassing signs at the junction where Middle
Fork Road begins and breaks off from Left Fork Road was sufficient to interrupt the
continuous use of Middle Fork Road. Since there was no continuous use of Middle Fork
Road, the trial court incorrectly determined that the road should be dedicated to the
public.
B.

The four witnesses presented by the plaintiff were not sufficient to
show use by the general public.

The trial court incorrectly determined that the witnesses presented by AWINC at
trial constituted members of the general public sufficient to meet the requirement of the
statute. Each of the witnesses had a self-serving interest in the road and thus their
testimony could not be considered to come from members of the general public for the
purpose of determining the applicability of § 72-5-104(1).
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AWINC states in its brief that each of its four witnesses " . . . . testified that he had
never owned or leased property in the area of Middle Fork Road . . . . " and because of
that cannot be considered to be using the road with permission. Appellee's brief at 25.
AWINC then states that the permission they sought was not for use of the road but for
hunting privileges on AWINC's property. Id. at 26. Simonsen does not contend that
these four witnesses owned or leased land in the area, just that they did, at certain points,
obtain permission to use land in the area and then accessed that land by using Middle
Fork Road. Regardless of what permission AWINC's witnesses sought in using the land,
adjoining landowners " . . . . or their personal visitors cannot be numbered in the class of
members of the general public using such road in a fashion that might ripen into a
dedication of a road under the statute." Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438 P.2d
545, 547 (Utah 1968). Any time period after permission was sought by AWINC's
witnesses, whether for the road or for hunting privileges, cannot be considered use by the
general public.
Furthermore, each of AWINC's witnesses had special interests in Middle Fork
Road and the land nearby. As discussed in Appellants' brief, pages 26-31, each one of
AWINC's witnesses had a special interest in the area, had invested a large amount of
time, and had a self-serving desire for Middle Fork Road to remain open. This selfserving and special interest in the road precludes AWINC's witnesses from being
considered members of the general public. Although the facts of Petersen dealt with
people who owned land next to the road in question, the court plainly stated that the core
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of this type of litigation is whether there is sufficient competent testimony, or whether
there were just a few witnesses with their own special interests in the road, in which case
it would not be enough to determine use by the general public. Petersen, 438 P.2d at
546-47.
In this case, AWINC presented just four witnesses to establish public use, and
each of them had special interests in Middle Fork Road. In response to Simonsen's
contention that these witnesses are not enough, AWINC, in its brief, asks why Simonsen
did " . . . . not say what number of persons he believes would document the public
experience [ o r ] . . . why he did not elicit the testimony of any such others." Appellee's
brief at 29. Such a challenge is not reflective of the burden in this type of litigation. The
burden is on the Plaintiff to show by clear and convincing evidence the elements of the
public dedication statute. It was not Simonsen's burden to show what number of
witnesses would be sufficient nor was it his burden to elicit testimony of "public
experience." This burden was on AWINC and it failed to produce any witnesses who
were truly members of the general public.
Each of AWINC's witnesses stated that they saw other unknown people using
Middle Fork Road on a fairly regular basis. (R.479:29-30,85-86;479:214;480:2324;480:49.) As AWINC filed its complaint against Simonsen in November of 2000 and
the case did not go to trial until January of 2003, AWINC had ample time to elicit
testimony from witnesses with less special interest in the road. AWINC did not secure
such testimony, only using testimony from four witnesses, all of whom had significant
20

interest in Middle Fork Road.
AWINC's witnesses were not truly members of the general public because of their
special interests in Middle Fork Road. Since these witnesses were not truly members of
the general public, the trial court incorrectly determined that element required by § 72-5104(1).
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT WERE NOT
CLEARLY SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO
ESTABLISH A CLEAR AND CONVINCING BURDEN OF PROOF.

The trial courts' findings of fact number twenty four indicating that Middle Fork
Road was continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of more than ten years,
was not based on sufficient evidence. Since AWINC did not prove each factor of the
statute by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous.
As stated above, and in Appellant's Brief pages 32-37, AWINC failed to show
continuous use by the general public. The fact that there have been "no trespassing"
signs at the junction of Middle Fork Road and Left Fork Road for decades, interrupts and
prevents the satisfaction of the continuous use requirement. To any reasonable person,
the posting of "no trespass" at the beginning of a road, would have the clear meaning of
prohibiting use of both the road and the adjoining land. Furthermore, in this area of the
State of Utah, no trespass signs are the most logical and practicable method of preventing
unauthorized users from coming on private property. If the posting of "no trespass" signs
is not enough to interrupt continuous use for dedication purposes, Simonsen can see no
way of completely keeping people off of private property short of constantly maintaining
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fencing or physical presence, either of which would be a heavy, difficult, and unfair
burden for a private landowner.
The evidence presented at trial was also insufficient to show by clear and
convincing evidence that the use was by the general public. As discussed above and in
Appellant's brief, each of AWINC 5s witnesses had a special or self-serving interest in
Middle Fork Road. AWINC's witnesses point out that many people were using the road
that were not connected with their parties. AWINC did not elicit any testimony from
these alleged other parties but instead based their claim of public use on four witnesses.
AWINC suggests that various maps and aerial photos show continuous and substantial
use of Middle Fork Road. Appellee's brief at 31. This evidence is not relevant to the
public use requirement because AWINC did not prove, nor is there any way to prove, that
this use was all non-permissive or by the general public.
The evidence provided by AWINC's four witnesses was insufficient for the trial
court to find that Middle Fork Road had been used continuously as a public thoroughfare
for ten years. Since the evidence is insufficient the subsequent finding of fact is clearly
erroneous.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Appellant, Randy T. Simonsen has standing to
prosecute this appeal, Appellants have sufficiently marshaled the evidence in this case,
the trial court incorrectly interpreted the statute, and the court based its findings of fact on
insufficient evidence. Appellants, respectfully request that the judgment entered by the
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Fourth Judicial District Court be reversed and that Middle Fork Road be declared to be a
private trail not accessible to the public. In the alternative, if the Court deems
appropriate, the matter be remanded to the trial court for additional evidence as
determined by this Court or the trial court.
DATED this /0_ day of November, 2004.
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